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Wages in domestically- owned Indonesian manufacturing plants taken over by foreign
firms increased sharply between the year before takeover and two years after takeover,
relative to plants remaining in domestic ownership.  Blue- collar wage levels in these plants
had been less than 10 per cent above and white- collar wages more than 10 per cent below
those in their industries a year before takeover.  Two years after takeover both were more
than 50 per cent above average.  Wages in foreign plants taken over by domestic owners
tended to rise less than average for their industries, although they remained above the
domestic average.  Thus, foreign firms did not select particularly high- wage plants to take
over and it was foreign takeovers, rather than takeovers in general, that led to large wage
increases and high wages.
An econometric analysis of the whole panel found that both foreign ownership
throughout the period and foreign takeover resulted in higher wages relative to domestically-
owned plants.  The wage effects for white- collar employees were typically around twice
those for blue- collar employees.  Foreign takeovers were associated with large increases in
blue- collar employment and both foreign and domestic takeovers with declines in white-
collar employment.  However, the employment changes were not strongly related to the wage
changes.
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Introduction
*
Many studies have found that affiliates of foreign firms pay higher wages than
locally- owned firms in their host countries.  That is generally true in both developed and
developing host countries.
1  In most cases, some margin in favor of employees of foreign-
owned firms remains even after industry, location, and establishment characteristics are taken
into account.  In one of the few cases in which labor quality could be taken into account,
beyond the distinction between production and non- production workers, it still seemed clear
that foreign firms in Indonesia paid a wage premium in 1996 (Lipsey and Sj￿holm, 2002).
2
While the existence of higher wages in foreign- owned plants is typical, the
differentials may not be caused by foreign ownership.  They might be simply the result of the
selection of high- wage establishments for acquisition by foreign firms, or the selection of
high- wage industries or regions for acquisition or the establishment of new plants by foreign
owners.  Analysis of cross sectional data within regions or industries, or within industries
within regions, can eliminate some of these selectivity biases. Data on worker quality, in the
rare cases where they are available, can eliminate others.  However, one other possible source
of bias remains.  That is that there may be unmeasured characteristics of individual firms or
establishments that are associated with both high wages and foreign ownership.
We attempt here to deal with this possibility in several ways.  One is to use a long
panel data set in a model with individual establishment fixed effects.  Any permanent
characteristics of individual establishments are absorbed by the fixed effects and do not
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appear as the consequence of foreign ownership.  Another is by following plants that changed
ownership from domestic to foreign or foreign to domestic to see if the change caused
increased wages relative to the plants￿ industries, regions, or industries within regions.
3
Panel data on Indonesian manufacturing
We analyze Indonesian manufacturing data supplied by the Indonesian Statistical
Office. The data include all manufacturing plants with more than 20 employees in any of the
years 1975-1999. Inclusion of plant identification codes enables us to construct a panel and
follow the plants over time. The number of plants in the Indonesian manufacturing sector
increased from 7,355 in 1975 to 22,041 in 1999 and the number of plants with foreign
ownership from 263 to 1,710.
4 The foreign share of Indonesian manufacturing employment
and value added is shown in table 1. The foreign share was rather low until 1985, about ten
percent of employment and 21 percent of value added. However, an economic crisis in the
mid 1980s, caused by falling prices of oil and other raw materials, forced Indonesia to
liberalize its FDI regime from around 1986. The result has been a sharp increase in the
relative importance of FDI, which amounts to about 21 percent of employment and 36
percent of value added in 1999. The foreign presence is relative low in Food products, Wood
products, and Paper and Pulp, and relative high in Basic Metal Industries, Fabricated Metal
Products and Other Industries.
The wage ratios between foreign owned and private-domestically owned plants are
shown in table 2.  In 1975; wages were about three times as high in foreign- owned plants as
in private domestic plants. The wage differences have gradually decreased over time and
were in 1999 about 44 percent for blue-collar workers and 68 percent for white-collar
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workers. The difference in blue collar- wages has been high in Food products, Paper and
Pulp, Chemicals and Non-Metallic Minerals, and in white-collar wages in Food products,
Non-Metallic Minerals, Fabricated Metal Industries, and Other Industries.  White-collar
wages have been higher in private domestic than in foreign- owned plants in Basic Metal
Products.
A frequently mentioned source of selectivity bias is foreign takeovers of high-wage
domestically- owned plants.  If foreign firms tended to take over the plants with the highest
average wage, either nationally, within industries, within regions, or within industries within
regions, a cross- section analysis would find that foreign- owned establishments paid higher
wages than domestically- owned establishments.  However, increases in foreign shares would
have no effect on average wages and would be associated with lower wages in domestically-
owned plants.
The best way to judge the effects of foreign ownership is to follow cases in which
takeovers took place.  We first examine wage levels in target plants before takeovers to learn
whether it is the selection of domestic firms for takeover that produces the higher wages
observed in foreign- owned plants.  We then calculate the changes in wage levels that
followed takeovers, relative to wage changes in domestically- owned Indonesian
manufacturing plants, to see whether differential wage changes could account for the higher
wages in foreign- owned  plants.
Table 3 shows the number of domestic takeovers of foreign plants and the number of
foreign takeovers of domestic plants from 1975 to 1999.  Fewer than one percent of the total
number of plants changed ownership from domestic to foreign or from foreign to domestic in
each year. However, the number increased over time, especially foreign takeovers.  They
grew from an average of 23 per year between 1975-1989 to 90 per year between 1990-1999.
The sharp increase in foreign takeovers was caused by the previously mentioned6
liberalization of the FDI regime that has taken place in Indonesia since the mid 1980s.
Domestic takeovers of foreign plants also increased, but not as much, from 29 per year in the
first period to 64 per year in the 1990s.
 Takeovers in both directions, foreign of domestic plants and domestic of foreign
plants, were larger, on average, than existing domestic plants, overall and in almost every
industry group in each period.  However, takeovers in both directions were considerably
smaller than existing foreign plants. Foreign takeovers were, on average larger than domestic
takeovers, but the margin was small overall and not consistent among industry groups.  Thus,
with respect to size, takeovers were not a random selection among domestic plants or foreign
plants.  Foreign takeovers were biased toward the larger domestic plants and domestic
takeovers toward the smaller foreign plants.
Table 4 answers the question as to whether foreign firms pay high wages on average
simply because they took over high-wage local firms. The table shows the wages one year
and two years before a foreign takeover of a private-domestically plant relative to wages in
private domestically-owned plants. It also shows the same information for foreign-owned
plants that were taken over by domestic owners.
Plants taken over by foreigners paid blue collar wages somewhat above the average in
all privately owned plants. The differentials were in the range of 10 to 20 per cent, far below
the differential in table 2. For white-collar employees, the contrast was even more striking.
While existing foreign plants paid more than 50 per cent more to such employees, the target
firms, before takeover, had been paying them about average wages for privately -owned
plants. Thus there is no evidence that the differentials in existing plants resulted from
selective acquisition of high- wage domestic plants.
The evidence for selectivity relative to domestic wage levels (but not foreign- owned
plant wage levels), is stronger for domestic takeovers of foreign-owned plants.  White-collar7
wages in domestic takeovers were at about average for domestically -owned plants, but blue-
collar wages were about 30 per cent higher.  Domestic firms were acquiring foreign-owned
plants with blue-collar wage levels well above average domestic levels, but not as much
above as in the average foreign plant.  Thus, domestic takeovers of foreign- owned plants
were of plants that paid relatively low wages for foreign- owned plants, particularly relatively
low white- collar wages.
Taken together, the two sets of averages suggest, first, that the tendency of foreign
takeovers of domestic plants to be biased toward high-wage domestic plants did not account
for most of the differentials found in existing plants between foreign and domestic owners.
Second, the fact that domestic takeovers of foreign-owned plants were biased toward plants
with higher wages than existing domestic plants tended to reduce the wage differential
between foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants.
Given the starting point for foreign takeovers described in Table 4, we can observe
the events that followed for the target plants in Table 5.  For manufacturing as a whole,
domestic plants taken over by foreign firms enjoyed large wage increases relative to existing
domestically- owned plants.  Blue-collar wages, which had been about 20 per cent above
average, unweighted,  before takeover, increased by 25 percentage points relative to average
domestic plant wages, averaging almost 50 per cent higher after 2 years of foreign ownership.
Weighted by sector employment, they had been only 5- 10 per cent above average before
foreign takeover but were 64 per cent higher two years after takeover.  White- collar wage
levels, had been close to average before takeover, unweighted, and about 10 per cent below,
weighted.  They rose even faster after takeover than blue- collar wages.  After 2 years of
foreign ownership, wages in the target plants were 80 per cent higher than average white-
collar wages, unweighted, and 64 per cent higher, weighted.8
There is a lot of variation among the five industry groups for which there are
sufficient numbers of observations. However, blue-collar wages increased relative to industry
average wages in four of the five and white-collar wages in all five. After two years of
foreign ownership, outside of industry group 33, wages in foreign-owned target plants ranged
from 30 to more than 100 per cent above the average in private domestic plants.
The story was very different in plants that passed from foreign to domestic ownership.
Blue-collar wages, which had been about 30 per cent above the average in private domestic
plants when these plants were foreign- owned, rose more slowly than average and after two
years of domestic ownership were only 15 per cent above average, both weighted and
unweighted.  White-collar wages rose, according to the unweighted comparisons, and
remained the same in relative terms according to the weighted calculations. After two years
of domestic ownership, they were still somewhat above domestic average wages, but by
nowhere near as much as the wages in the plants moving into foreign ownership or the plants
in foreign ownership throughout our period. In the five industry groups, six out of 10
comparisons show declines in wage levels relative to the averages. Four out of the ten
showed these plants to have lower than average wage levels after a period of domestic
ownership.
One reason for comparing foreign takeovers with takeovers by domestic firms is to
test whether the wage increases we see in the former group are the result simply of takeovers,
regardless of ownership. The results indicate that change of ownership itself is not the source
of the wage increases. It is the change to foreign ownership that produced rapid wage growth
and high wage levels.9
Econometric Estimations
The previous discussion suggests that foreign plants pay relative high wages and that
foreign takeovers of domestic plants raise both blue- and white-collar wages. Moreover it
seemed that high wages in domestic plants taken over by foreigners explain only a very
minor part of the higher wages in foreign plants.  We continue with an econometric analysis
to further examine the wage difference by estimating different variations of the following
equation:
it it it it it e ε σ λ β + + + + + + = Tim Region Sector X ln ownership W ln .                (1)
where i and t index plants and years respectively. W is average wage, and ownership is a
dummy variable for foreign or government ownership. X is a vector with plant specific
characteristics such as size, and the use of electricity and other inputs. Sector dummy
variables, at a 2-digit level of ISIC, regional dummy variables, and time dummy variables
control for sector, regional or time specific wage effects. σ is a time invariant plant specific
effect , which will be estimated both as a random and as a fixed effect.
The effect of foreign ownership on wages is seen in table 6. The results, in the first
two columns, within industries, regions, and years, show that foreign- owned establishments
paid 67 per cent more for blue- collar workers and 90 per cent more for white- collar workers.
Some of that difference is associated with the characteristics of the individual plants, such as
their size and their inputs of energy, as a proxy for capital intensity, and other intermediate
inputs, all of which are correlated with their ownership.  If we include these characteristics as
explanatory variables, thus attributing the association with wages to them, rather than to
foreign ownership, the differential is much reduced, to 29 per cent for blue- collar workers
and 43 per cent for white- collar workers (columns 2 and 3). Using a robust (cluster)
estimation of the standard errors, to control for the possibility that the standard errors are not
independent within plants, does not have much effect on the results. The random effect10
estimates include plant specific effects in the error term and use variation both between and
within plants. One common problem with the random effect model is that the error term
might be correlated with the independent variables, which we test for with a Hausman
specification test. The random effects estimations reduce the effect of foreign ownership on
wages to about 17 percent for blue-collar workers and 25 percent for white-collar workers.
However, the assumption of no correlation between the error term and the independent
variables is strongly rejected by the Hausman test. Finally, the fixed effect examines
variations within plants and variables that do not change over time will be fully absorbed by
the plant specific fixed effect. If plant fixed effects are introduced, as in the last two columns,
the remaining differentials are 10 per cent and 21 per cent.  The fixed effect estimation is a
very conservative estimate of the effect of foreign ownership because it represents wages
only in the foreign ownership period of plants that changed ownership, and these wage levels
are compared with each plant￿s wages over the whole period, including the years of foreign
ownership.  Any wage differences from domestic plants in plants that were always under
foreign ownership disappear into the fixed effects.
In table 7, we divide foreign plants into greenfield investments, plants that have been
foreign owned throughout the period they are in our data, and foreign takeovers, plants that
have previously been domestically owned during the period. The greenfield category includes
plants established as foreign- owned during our period and never taken over by domestic
firms, but also plants that were established or taken over by foreign firms before 1975, and
never changed to domestic ownership.
5  The first four columns are without plant specific
effects. It is seen that foreign takeovers as well as greenfield investments pay comparatively
high wages. The wage premium in foreign takeovers is about 60 percent for blue-collar
wages and 87 percent for white-collar wages, broadly in line with the results in Table 6 for
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foreign ownership in general. Some of the increased wages following a foreign takeover may
be explained by increased size, capital intensity, or use of intermediate inputs.  This explains
why the wage differences decrease to about 28 percent for blue-collar wages and 41 percent
for white-collar wages after inclusion of the control variables. The coefficients for Foreign
takeovers are only marginally smaller than for greenfield which suggest that wages in
formerly domestic-private plants converge towards wages in established foreign plants after
the domestic plants are taken over by foreign firms. The coefficient for Domestic takeover is
positive and statistically significant.  This does not mean that wages increase after a domestic
takeover but instead that they remain higher than in other private-domestic plants. More
specifically, the coefficient for foreign ownership was found in table 6 to be about 0.29 for
blue-collar wages and 0.43 for white-collar wages. Hence, wages seems to decline after a
domestic takeover of a foreign plant but they still remain about 6 percent higher for blue-
collar wages and 10 percent higher for white-collar wages than in the average private-
domestic plant.
Foreign greenfield investments have been excluded from the fixed effect estimations
since their foreign ownership is constant over time and since we want to compare the
takeovers with private-domestic plants. The fixed effect estimates reduce the apparent effect
of foreign takeovers but not the coefficient for domestic takeovers. Foreign takeovers seem to
increase blue-collar wages by about 17 percent and white-collar wages about 33 percent.
Since most takeovers are concentrated in a few sectors, we run the estimations at a
sector level in table 8. There are positive effects of foreign takeovers on wages in all five
sectors, ranging between 11 and 23 percent for blue-collar wages and between 23 and 50
percent for white-collar wages. The result for domestic takeovers is less clear, with a positive
and statistically significant coefficient for both blue- and white-collar wages in three sectors,
and a negative and statistically significant coefficient for blue-collar wages in one sector.12
Hence, it seems that foreign takeovers have a substantial positive effect on average wages
across the whole range of industries. Moreover, plants that have had foreign ownership
continue to pay higher wages than average private-domestic plants after they are taken over
by domestic owners.
This finding that average wages rise does not necessarily imply that individual
workers￿ wages increase with foreign ownership.  An increase in the average wage might
come, for example, through the dismissal of low-wage workers.  We therefore examined
changes in employment after takeovers. There were major changes in employment after
takeovers, and the changes were strikingly different for blue- and white-collar employees, as
seen in table 9. While the number of blue-collar workers increased by 38 percent after foreign
takeovers, the number of white-collar employees decreased by 28 percent. The decrease in
white-collar employees was even larger after a domestic takeover of a foreign plant, 32
percent.  Domestic takeovers had almost no effect on the number of blue-collar workers.
The figures at a sector level confirm that foreign takeovers consistently raised the
number of blue-collar workers and reduced the number of white-collar workers. Domestic
takeovers of foreign owned plants had a consistent negative effect on the number of white-
collar workers and a more uncertain effect on the number of blue-collar workers. Hence, it
seems that there were changes in the number of employees that could have had an impact on
average wages.
In table 10, we include the growth in numbers of blue- and white-collar workers
compared to the previous year as a variable explaining wage levels. Both variables are
statistically significant with negative signs. Hence, an increase in employment has a negative
effect on average wages, implying that  new blue- collar employees had, on average, lower
wages than existing employees. By the same argument, the decrease in white-collar workers
found in table 9, in combination with the increase in average wages shown in table 7, implies13
that those removed were lower- paid than the average. However, including growth in
employment in the regressions has only a marginal effect on the coefficient for Foreign
takeovers and no effect on the coefficient for Domestic takeovers.  The implication is that the
change in employment is not the major explanation for the change in wages following a
takeover by foreign firms.
Since there were major changes in employment after takeovers, it is conceivable that
there might have been average wage effects from the substitution of more highly educated
workers for those with less education.  Unfortunately, data on worker education levels are
available for only a few years.  Within the one and two- year spans covered by the education
data, there are no indications of major changes in the education mix of the labor force (not
shown).  However, we cannot be certain that worker education levels did not change sharply
in other periods.
Concluding Remarks
Foreign ￿ owned establishments in Indonesia, as in other countries, pay higher wages
than domestically- owned establishments, even when industry, region, plant characteristics,
and worker characteristics are taken into account.  What has not been so obvious is whether
these higher wages are a consequence of foreign ownership itself or are associated with
persistent plant characteristics, unknown in nature, but not determined by foreign ownership.
This paper examines the question in two ways.  The first involves separating firms into those
taken over by foreigners from domestic owners, those taken over by domestic owners from
foreigners, and those not changing ownership.  We examine wage levels in establishments
before they are taken over, to learn whether foreign firms select high- wage plants to acquire,
and we examine wage changes after takeover.  The second method involves an econometric
analysis of the relation of average plant wage levels to foreign ownership and changes in14
foreign ownership, taking account of other influences on wage levels, such as plant
characteristics and changes in employment after takeover.
Foreign firms tended to take over large domestic plants.  These plants had relatively
high blue-collar wages, although not as high as those in foreign- owned plants in general, by
a large margin.  These plants paid average white-collar wages.  After foreign takeovers, both
white collar and blue-collar wages in these  plants rose strongly, especially the white- collar
wages.
Domestic takeovers targeted relatively small foreign plants with blue- and white-
collar wages that were lower than the foreign average but higher than the domestic average.
Wages tended to decline after a domestic takeover although they still remained above the
private-domestic average. Hence, it was not takeovers themselves that increased wages, but
the change in ownership from domestic to foreign.
An econometric analysis of wages using the whole panel of data, found that foreign
ownership, in an equation that included time, industry, and region dummies, was associated
with blue collar wages two- thirds higher than in domestically- owned private plants, and
white- collar wages almost twice as high.  Many of these wage differences were associated
with plant characteristics, such as size and input use, and when these were introduced, the
foreign plant margins were reduced to about 30 and 40 per cent.
A further analysis distinguished plants taken over during the period from those always
foreign and from domestic takeovers.  It found that both foreign ownership and foreign
takeover result in blue- collar wages about 30 per cent above the average for domestically-
owned private plants and white- collar wages 40 to 45 per cent higher, even holding constant
time, industry, and region.  A fixed effect version, which is a conservative measure of the
foreign ownership effect, reduced the margins for takeovers to 17 per cent and a third.15
We also examined changes in employment after takeovers. There were decreases in
numbers of white-collar workers after both foreign and domestic takeovers and a strong
increase in blue-collar workers after foreign takeovers. There is a significant negative
relationship between employment changes and wage levels. Since blue collar employment
increased greatly in foreign takeovers, that negative effect implies that the additional
employees were lower paid than the existing employees, and since white collar employment
decreased, the negative effect implied that lower paid white collar employees were losing
jobs. However, including the change in employment did not substantially affect the impact of
the foreign takeovers on wages.
From all of these analyses, we conclude that foreign ownership or acquisition of an
Indonesian manufacturing plant results in higher wages for the plant￿s employees.16
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Table 1. The foreign share of Indonesian manufacturing industry between 1975-1999 at a 2-
digit level of ISIC (%).
1975 1985 1995 1999 Sector ISIC
Empl. VA Empl. VA Empl. VA Empl. VA
Total 8.5 22.9 10.0 21.4 17.8 30.5 20.7 35.7
Food proucts 31 4.0 21.4 4.0 11.7 6.2 11.7 8.0 15.5
Textiles 32 7.8 26.5 11.3 29.1 23.5 25.1 24.8 37.5
Wood 33 11.2 23.9 11.7 13.3 8.0 13.2 10.4 20.0
Paper 34 7.1 16.9 5.6 9.6 16.3 32.1 14.3 21.6
Chemicals 35 16.9 28.6 14.0 27.7 16.7 43.0 17.7 45.4
Non-Mettalic Mineral 36 10.3 16.2 8.4 42.0 10.0 25.2 12.7 37.7
Basic Metal Industr. 37 12.7 15.8 20.0 12.8 17.6 41.6 25.2 43.0
Fabricated Metals 38 18.1 22.7 18.2 29.7 34.1 48.4 44.2 57.4
Other Manufacturing 39 4.2 1.6 12.9 41.2 40.0 61.3 44.5 53.9
Note: Empl. ￿ Employment. VA- Value Added.18
Table 2. The ratios of average wages in foreign owned and private-domestically owned plants
between 1975-1999 at a 2-digit level of ISIC.

















Total 2.80 3.11 2.27 1.81 1.67 1.70 1.44 1.68
31 4.10 4.64 3.55 1.98 1.94 1.70 1.70 2.11
32 2.21 3.15 1.46 1.55 1.13 1.28 1.31 1.69
33 1.24 1.24 1.18 1.27 1.23 1.53 1.12 1.49
34 2.56 4.44 1.74 2.42 1.80 1.18 1.79 1.22
35 3.98 2.81 2.98 1.96 1.97 2.24 1.79 1.41
36 4.69 4.75 2.66 2.02 2.63 2.06 2.19 1.71
37 0.86 1.30 1.45 0.69 1.31 1.28 1.04 0.80
38 1.58 1.48 1.85 1.73 1.49 1.54 1.29 1.96
39 0.76 1.00 1.61 2.28 1.45 2.16 1.16 2.08
Note: Average wages for domestic-private and foreign plants have been calculated at a 3-
digit level of ISIC and aggregated up to a 2-digit level of ISIC using shares of total blue-
collar and white-collar employees as weights. See table 1 for sector names19
 Table 3. The number of takeovers in the Indonesian manufacturing sector 1975-1999.
Average Size
Sector No. of Takeovers Takeovers Existing Plants
Domestic Foreign Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
1975-1989
Total 408 326 250 210 358 103
31 116 92 219 160 303 105
32 96 80 265 243 732 105
33 50 37 290 230 368 136
34 15 6 42 79 263 78
35 47 45 297 309 230 113
36 28 19 192 264 423 54
37 4 1 61 401 477 248
38 48 39 283 150 318 110
39 4 7 124 98 241 69
1990-1999
Total 637 917 426 418 539 153
31 95 127 316 226 358 119
32 177 226 681 701 1054 210
33 85 92 367 363 471 188
34 16 23 285 795 633 134
35 90 150 281 233 283 158
36 33 44 385 357 447 75
37 8 13 177 224 292 221
38 106 205 379 310 453 135
39 27 37 481 339 568 120
Note: Size is the average number of total employees. Domestic takeovers refer only to
takeovers of foreign plants. See table 1 for sector names.20
Table 4. Wages in Target Establishments Relative to All Private Establishments
Foreign takeovers of private-domestic plantsPrivate-domestic takeovers of foreign plants
T-2 T-1 T-2 T-1
Unweighted
Total Blue 1.18 1.22 1.30 1.31
Total White 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.98
Weighted by sector employment
Total Blue 1.09 1.06 1.43 1.38
Total White 0.87 0.91 1.35 1.32
By Sector
31 Blue 0.99 1.03 2.12 2.08
31 White 0.73 0.72 1.70 1.52
32 Blue 1.16 1.12 1.13 1.21
32 White 1.15 1.38 1.40 1.41
33 Blue 1.17 0.90 1.05 0.81
33 White 0.75 0.74 1.29 1.19
35 Blue 1.22 1.21 1.84 1.52
35 White 1.01 0.82 0.98 1.05
38 Blue 0.88 0.94 1.09 1.07
38 White 0.65 0.82 1.16 1.24
Note: T-2 (T-1) refers to two (one) years before the year of the takeover.21
Table 5. Changes and Levels after Takeover in the Ratio of Wages in Target Establishments to Wages in All Privately-owned
Establishments.
Foreign takeovers of private-domestic plantsPrivate-domestic takeovers of foreign plants
Changes Levels Changes Levels
(T+2)-(T-1) T+2 (T+2)-(T-1) T+2
Unweighted
Total Blue +0.26 1.48 -0.16 1.15
Total White +0.82 1.81 +0.17 1.15
Weighted by sector employment
Total Blue +0.58 1.64 -0.23 1.15
Total White +0.65 1.56 0 1.32
By Sector
31 Blue +1.04 2.07 -0.98 1.10
31 White +0.65 1.37 -0.93 0.59
32 Blue +0.44 1.56 -0.27 0.94
32 White +1.02 2.40 +0.39 1.80
33 Blue -0.04 0.86 +0.39 1.20
33 White +0.27 1.01 -0.17 1.02
35 Blue +0.52 1.73 +0.64 2.16
35 White +0.58 1.40 +1.39 2.44
38 Blue +0.95 1.89 -0.11 0.96
38 White +0.50 1.32 -0.47 0.7722





































































































































Time dummies estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated
Industry dummies estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated -- --
Regional
dummies
estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated -- --
Robust standard
errors (cluster)
-- -- -- -- estimated estimated -- -- -- --
Establishment
random effect
-- -- -- -- -- -- estimated estimated -- --
Hausman test
(chisquare)
-- -- -- -- -- -- 2,460*** 2,001*** -- --
Establishment
fixed effect
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- estimated estimated
R-square 0.64 0.53 0.72 0.61 0.72 0.61 0.72 0.61 0.66 0.57
No of
observations
336,576 269,536 316,031 256,852 316,031 256,852 316,031 256,852 316,031 256,852
Note: Standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level; **) significant at the five percent level; *)significant at the ten
percent level.23
Table 7. The relation of average plant wage to changes in ownership and plant characteristics 1975-1999 (dependent variable ￿


























































































Time dummies estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated
Industry dummies estimated estimated estimated estimated -- --
Regional dummies estimated estimated estimated estimated -- --
Fixed effect -- -- -- -- estimated estimated
R-square 0.64 0.53 0.72 0.61 0.66 0.57
No of plants -- -- -- -- 44,050 38,145
No of observations 336,576 269,536 316,031 256,852 304,738 245,837
Note: Standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level; **) significant at the five percent level; *)significant at
the ten percent level. Domestic takeovers refers only to takeovers of foreign plants.24
Table 8. The relation of average plant wage to ownership changes and plant characteristics at a sector level (dependent variable ￿
average wage per employee).
Food Products (ISIC
31)
Textiles (ISIC 32) Wood Products
(ISIC 33)




































































































































































Time dummies estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated
Fixed effect estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated
R-square 0.66 0.56 0.78 0.63 0.56 0.49 0.71 0.55 0.71 0.59
No of plants 11,551 9,903 11,051 8,715 6,490 5,871 4,814 4,629 4,440 4,123
No of observations 86,456 66,867 72,626 52,276 34,468 30,244 34,147 31,876 29,822 27,012
Note: Standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level; **) significant at the five percent level; *)significant at
the ten percent level. Domestic takeovers refers only to takeovers of foreign plants.25
Table 9. Employment of blue- and white-collar workers before and after takeovers.
Foreign takeovers of private-domestic plants Private-domestic takeovers of foreign plants Sector
T-1 T+2 Growth T-1 T+2 Growth
Unweighted
Total Blue 327 452 38,4% 243 243 0,1%
Total White 61 44 -27,4% 66 45 -32,1%
Weighted by sector employment
Total Blue 380 573 50,8% 336 355 5,6%
Total White 64 46 -28,7% 70 45 -36,1%
By Sector
31 Blue 167 247 47,9% 90 108 21,2%
31 White 97 74 -23,5% 86 28 -67,2%
32 Blue 595 1002 68,3% 670 737 10,0%
32 White 67 37 -45,4% 66 78 18,2%
33 Blue 431 524 21,4% 140 112 -19,9%
33 White 84 73 -13,4% 46 40 -12,8%
35 Blue 216 223 3,1% 91 99 9,0%
35 White 29 19 -33,6% 73 25 -65,2%
38 Blue 223 264 18,3% 224 159 -29,1%
38 White 29 19 -33,6% 61 53 -12,4%
Note: T-1 (T+2) refers to one year before (two years after) the year of the takeover26
Table 10. The relation of average plant wage to changes in ownership and plants
characteristics including changes in employment (dependent variable ￿ average wage
per employee).

















Growth in Blue Collar -0.10
(0.00)***
--
Growth in White Collar -- -0.20
(0.00)***












Time dummies estimated estimated
Fixed effect estimated estimated
R-square 0.66 0.57
No of plants 38,201 31,501
No of observations 259,514 201,787
Note: Standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level;
**) significant at the five percent level; *)significant at the ten percent level.